|
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR |
JUNE 10, 1944 |
4802, and Alice Ecoffey, widow of Jule Ecoffey, deceased, Oglala Sioux Allottee No. 1358, for reimbursement under the act of June 11, 1940 (54 Stat. 298, 25 U.S.C. sec. 352c), as amended by the act of February 10, 1942 (56 Stat. 87, 25 U.S.C. sec. 352c), of taxes paid by the allottees after patents had been issued to them during the trust period without their applications.
You propose to reimburse the allottees or their heirs for the taxes paid from the time the patents were issued until the lands were sold by the allottees. It is noted that the allottees in all instances mortgaged their allotments soon after they received the fee patents.
The act of February 10, 1942, supra, after authorizing the Secretary to reimburse the Indian allottees or their Indian heirs or devisees for all taxes paid on their allotted lands patented in fee prior to the expiration of the trust period without application or consent of the patentees, provides:
". . . That if the Indian allottee, or his or her Indian heirs or Indian devisees, have by their own act, accepted such patent, no reimbursement shall be made for taxes paid, including penalties and interest, subsequent to acceptance of the patent: Provided further, That the fact of such acceptance shall be determined by the Secretary of the Interior."The present records will not in my opinion justify a determination by the Secretary that the allottees did not by their own acts accept the patents when they mortgaged the lands. There is no information contained in the attached files as to the circumstances under which the mortgages were executed or what use was made of the money borrowed on the security of the lands. It may very well be that if the mortgages were executed for the purpose of raising money to pay the taxes on the lands the allottees should not be considered to have accepted the fee patents within the meaning of the 1942 act. On the other hand, if the allottees used the money for purposes entirely unrelated to the tax liability of their allotments, I do not see how it can be contended that they did not by their acts of executing the mortgages accept the patents and thus waive their claim to relief.
That the execution of a mortgage is ordinarily tantamount to the consent for the issuance of the patents was succinctly stated by former Solicitor Patterson in his opinion of February 24, 1928 (52 L.D. 325, 326), wherein it was said:
". . . Acceptance depends upon consent and a mortgagor who makes use of a title to secure a benefit, such as a loan, will not be heard to deny the giving of the consent upon which the validity of the mortgage given to secure the loan depends. . . ."I do not mean to suggest that in every instance where an allottee has mortgaged his allotment he has forfeited his right to reimbursement under the act of February 10, 1942, supra, but I do suggest that where an allottee has mortgaged his land, the Secretary must have information upon which he may base a finding that the mortgage did not constitute such acceptance before he can reimburse the allottee or his heirs for the taxes paid after the execution of the mortgage.
More factual information is needed in the three cases returned herewith. The primary objects for which the mortgages were executed should be shown. The Superintendent of the Reservation should be instructed to assist the claimants in preparing their statements as to the purposes for which the mortgages were executed and to indicate whether, in his opinion, the mortgages were executed for the purpose of raising money to pay the taxes.
If the claimants cannot establish the fact that they did not, by their acts of mortgaging their land, accept the fee patents, their claims for reimbursement under the act of February 10, 1942, supra, should be amended to include only that period between the issuance of the patents and the execution of the mortgages.
FOWLER HARPER,
POWER OF
SECRETARY TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY
OF APPROVING
BONDS GIVEN BY OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES
OF DEPARTMENT
Memorandum Opinion, June 14, 1944.
The approval of bonds required of officers and employees of the Department of the Interior is an act which does not require administrative discretion.
The approval by the Secretary of the bond of any officer or employee of the Department of the Interior, either under the act of August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. 279, 6 U.S.C. sec. 6), or under a specific statute, may be delegated to the Chief Clerk "as chief executive officer of the department" (44 Stat. 854, 5 U.S.C. sec. 484).
HARPER,
Solicitor:
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JUNE 14, 1944 |
Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary:
Reference is made to your memorandum of April 29, requesting my advice "as to whether or not approval of bonds of employees of the Department under the act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat. 808), can be delegated to the Chief Clerk should it be determined that it is administratively desirable to do so."
In my opinion, delegation by the Secretary to the Chief Clerk of the approval of any bond required from an employee of the Department would be valid legally.
The statute mentioned in your memorandum provides in part that "every officer whose duty it is to take and approve official bonds shall cause all such bonds to be renewed every four years after their dates, but he may require such bonds to be renewed or strengthened oftener if he deems such action necessary." (28 Stat. 807, 6 U.S.C. sec. 3.)
The general requirement of Secretarial approval is contained in the single sentence of the act of August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. 279, 6 U.S.C. sec. 6), emphasized below:
"Whenever any recognizance, stipulation, bond, or undertaking conditioned for the faithful performance of any duty, or for doing or refraining from doing anything in such recognizance, stipulation, bond, or undertaking specified, is by the laws of the United States required or permitted to be given with one surety or with two or more sureties, the execution of the same or the guaranteeing of the performance of the condition thereof shall be sufficient when executed or guaranteed solely by a corporation incorporated under the laws of the United States, or of any State having power to guarantee the fidelity of persons holding positions of public or private trust, and to execute and guarantee bonds and undertakings in judicial proceedings. Such recognizance, stipulation, bond, or undertaking shall be approved by the head of department, court, judge, officer, board, or body executive, legislative, or judicial required to approve or accept the same. No officer or person having the approval of any bond shall exact that it shall be furnished by the guarantee company or by any particular guarantee company."In addition, the statutes requiring that bonds be furnished by officers and employees in specific posts often provide that the bond shall be approved by the Secretary. These statutes, together with the principal kinds of bonds used in the Department, are discussed in some detail in an appendix to this opinion.
The statutory requirement of Secretarial approval dates back half a century to a time when the executive departments were so small in number of employees that it was not unusual for the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary to know personally both the principal and the two individual sureties on the bond. Since the personal integrity of the principal and the financial responsibility of the individual sureties constituted the only protection afforded the Federal Government, it is not surprising to find a statutory requirement of approval by the Secretary. Approval under these conditions clearly meant an exercise of administrative discretion.
The situation today is entirely different. Hundreds of bonds hare given annually by officers and employees of the Department. Investigation by my office reveals that the whole process of bonding an employee requires only three steps. The first step is to determine the amount of the bond. A glance through the material in the appendix to this opinion will show either (1) that the amount of the bond is fixed by statute, as in the case of a register of a land office, or (2) that the amount of the bond is fixed by rule of the Department, as in the case of a special disbursing agent or a certifying officer. In a word, determining the amount of the bond no longer involves discretion. Instead, it requires only the application of a formula.
The second step in the bonding process is approving the surety. In contrast to the earlier custom of using two individual sureties, the present universal practice of the Department is to use a corporate surety.1 Treasury Form 356, dated April 10, 1944, is entitled "Companies holding Certificates of Authority from the Secretary of the Treasury under the Acts of Congress of August 13, 1894, and March 23, 1910, as Acceptable Sureties on Federal Bonds; Net Limit for which they may be Accepted on any Risk; States in which they are Incorporated and Licensed to do Business: and Judicial Districts in which they have Appointed Process Agents . . ." A total of 81 surety companies is Listed. Thus, approving a particular surety means little more than ascertaining whether it is on the Treasury list.
The final step in the bonding process is deter-
____________
1 The only exception seems to be the bond for subsistence advance,
on which individual sureties customarily are used. Authority to approve
bonds for subsistence advances was given to the Chief Clerk in a Memorandum
for Heads of: Bureaus and Offices from the Acting Secretary on October
31, 1938.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR |
JUNE 14, 1944 |
mining whether the representative of the surety company with whom the Department is dealing has the authority to sign a contract for an amount as large as that appearing on the bond in question. A file in the office of the Chief Clerk contains a list of all representatives of all surety companies with which the Department does business, together with a complete statement covering the scope of authority of each representative. The process, therefore, of determining the extent of a particular agent's power to do business, likewise turns out to be largely mechanical.
The act of July 3, 1926 (44 Stat. 854, 5 U.S.C. sec. 484), provides:
"The chief clerk of the Department of the Interior shall be the chief executive officer of the department and may be designated by the Secretary to sign official papers and documents, including the authorization of expenditures from the contingent and other appropriations for the department, its bureaus and offices, section 675 of Title 31 to the contrary notwithstanding."In view of the nondiscretionary character of the process presently utilized in bonding employees of the Department, it is my opinion that the Secretary may delegate to the Chief Clerk as "chief executive officer of the department," the approval required either by the act of August 13, 1894, or I V specific statute of any employee bond.
FOWLER HARPER,
Appendix
In this appendix an analysis is made of the principal kinds of bonds used in the Department. Existing statutory authority and Departmental regulations covering particular types of bonds have both been included.
1. Agent-cashier bonds are approved by the Assistant Secretary. These bonds are given on Treasury Forms No. 1671-G-Revised, and No. 1671-E-Revised, issued by the Division of Disbursement, Treasury Department. Form No. 1671-G, the "dual purpose bond," is used where the employee collects money for some administrative office of this Department and also serves as the agent-cashier for the Treasury. Form 1671-E, the "single purpose bond," is used where the employee has disbursing functions only. Each of these forms states that "the said Principal has been designated by G. F. Allen, Chief Disbursing Officer, Division of Disbursement, Treasury Department, as Agent-Cashier to act in his place and stead in making payments. . ."
Thus the function of the agent-cashier becomes that of custodian of Federal funds. Sometimes the collection of these funds constitutes part of the employee's work, as in the case of a ticket agent of the Alaska Railroad, who has been appointed an agent-cashier. In other instances Federal funds are deposited with the agent-cashier who disburses them for a certain purpose. The Geological Survey, for example, may send a surveyor on a project into the interior of Alaska. The surveyor may need the services of a rodman whom he hires and pays on the spot with Federal money which has been furnished him. Or the War Relocation Authority may require the services of an agent-cashier who pays out money for certain specified purposes at a relocation center.
Bonds of "the disbursing clerks authorized by law in the several departments" are provided for by the Act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. 553, 5 U.S.C. sec. 44) which reads:
The disbursing clerks authorized by law in the several departments shall be appointed by the heads of the respective departments; and shall each give bond to the United States for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office according to law in such amount as shall be directed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and with sureties to the satisfaction of the General Counsel for the Department of the Treasury; and shall from time to time renew, strengthen, and increase his official bond, as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct."The function of the disbursement of moneys of the United States, subject to certain exceptions not here material, was transferred to the Treasury Department by Section 4 of Executive Order No. 6166, dated June 10, 1933, and together with the Office of Disbursing Clerk of that Department was consolidated in a Division of Disbursement at the head of which is a Chief Disbursing Officer. Section 4 then provided:
"The Division of Disbursement of the Treasury Department is authorized to establish local offices, or to delegate the exercise of its functions locally to officers or employees of other agencies, according as the interests of efficiency and economy may require."As is stated on the face of the two Treasury Forms mentioned previously, it is under this authority to delegate that the agent-cashiers of this Department are appointed.
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OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR |
JUNE 14, 1944 |
While not particularly material to the present discussion, it should be noted that the Division of Disbursement was consolidated in the Fiscal Service by Reorganization Plan No. III, sec. 1 (a) (3) June 30, 1940, 5 F.R. 2107.
2. Bonds of Registers of Land Offices are approved by the Assistant Secretary. These bonds are given on Department Form 4-222 (June 1937). The statutory authority for requiring them is contained in 30 Stat. 234, as amended, 43 U.S.C. sec. 72, Supp., and in 43 Stat. 1145, 43 U.S.C. sec. 79. These statutes provide:
"There shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a register of the land office for each land district established by law, who shall have charge of and attend to the sale of public and Indian lands within their respective districts, as provided by law and official regulations, and shall be accountable under their official bond for the proceeds of such sales, and for all fees, commissions, or other moneys received by them under any provision of lawAn interesting sidelight on the application of these provisions appears in the old case of United States v. Linn, 40 U.S. 290 (1841). Linn had been appointed "Receiver of Public Moneys" at the Land Office of the District of Vandalia, Illinois. [The offices of register and receiver of land offices were combined as of July 1, 1925 (43 Stat. 1145, 43 U.S.C. sec. 71)]. The United States sued Linn and his sureties to recover a sum of money in his hands. One defense was that, since the defendants had not affixed their seals to the instrument, it was void as a bond running to the United States. In holding the instrument valid, the Supreme Court made the following observation concerning the prior case of United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 364:"Every register shall, before entering on the or official regulation, duties of his office, give bond in the penal sum of $10,000, with approved security, for the faithful discharge of his trust."
"The Court there say, it has been objected that Hall was not entitled to act as paymaster until he had given the bond required by the act of 1816, in the form therein prescribed; and that not having given any such bond, he is not accountable as paymaster for any moneys received by him. We are, say the Court, of a different opinion. Hall's appointment as a paymaster was complete when his appointment was duly made by the President, and confirmed by the Senate. The giving the bond was a mere ministerial act, for the security of the government; and not a condition precedent to his authority to act as a paymaster." (Emphasis supplied.)3. Bonds of assistant disbursing officers are approved by the Assistant Secretary. They are given on Treasury Department Form 280-B. As in the case of the agent-cashier, the assistant disbursing officer is an employee of this Department who handles and disburses Federal funds. Certain employees of the Alaska Railroad, for example, have been named assistant disbursing officers.
Treasury Form 280-B contains a space for the name and title of the department officer who approves the bond. There is no requirement appearing on this form that the bond must be approved by the Assistant Secretary. Section 3614 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. sec. 481), however, provides:
"Whenever it becomes necessary for the head of any department or office to employ special agents, other than officers of the Army or Navy, who may be charged with the disbursement of public moneys, such agents shall, before entering upon duty, give bond in such form and with such security as the head of the department or office employing them may approve."4. Several kinds of bonds are used in the operations of the Office of Indian Affairs. All are on forms of this Department rather than on those furnished by the Treasury. Title to the money or other property which these bonds secure ordinarily is vested in the Indians themselves and not in the Government of the United States. Where money is involved, it is not covered into the Federal Treasury but instead is deposited in local banks.
Three types of bonds are presently approved by the Assistant Secretary. The first, on Department Form 1-003a, is the bond of the special disbursing agent. The form still in use is marked "Edition of March, 1910, Req. 9170." The amount for which this bond is given will vary from $25,000 to $50,000, depending on the amount of money with which the principal is entrusted. The form contains the following:
"Office of the SecretaryThe second type of the Indian Office bonds is on Department Form 5-022. It carries the printed words, "Approved: . . . Assistant Secretary." The
-----------, 19--"The within bond is hereby approved and transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury.
----------------------
Secretary."
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR |
JUNE 14, 1944 |
principal binds himself to keep safely and to account faithfully and honestly "without fraud or delay, for all public or other moneys and/or property advanced to or coming the possession or control of the said principal by virtue of his position." The third type, on Department Form 1-003g, is for safeguarding "moneys, . . . and property . . ." It carries the same notation for Secretarial approval as does Form 1003-a.
The fourth type is a bond in the amount of $10,000 which is executed by one who has applied to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for a license to trade with the Indians. The fifth type is a bond on Department Form 5-020, approved by the Department on June 7, 1926. It is executed by a bank which has been granted authority to receive on deposit "certain funds derived from the sale, rent, or leasing of Indian lands, or from the bale of timber on such lands, or from other sources, either to the official credit of a United States disbursing officer or to the personal credit of Indians, for the funds being held in trust by such officer or by the United States for the use of beneficiaries, whether Indians or other persons . . ."
Bonds, of types four and five originally were approved by the Assistant Secretary. They are now approved by the Office of Indian Affairs under the authority of Department Order No. 1721; which listed Indian matters in 11 categories that thereafter did not need to be presented "for departmental consideration and action." Item 9 is the "Approval of surety bonds; provided that in the case of corporate surety the bonding company has been approved by the Treasury Department."
A series of special statutes governs the giving of bonds by certain employees of the Office of Indian Affairs.
The basic statute is section 465 of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. sec. 9), which provides that
"The President may prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the settlement of the accounts of Indian affairs."In addition, section 2057 of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. sec. 29) required Indian agents to "give bonds in such penalties and with such security as the President or the Secretary of the Interior may require. "And in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 150 Fed. 550 (C.C.A. 9th, 1907), the court said:
"By these statutes, the President and the Secretary of the Interior are given the authority to determine the character of the bond, both as to its, penalty and the nature and condition of its obligation."Section 2057 of the Revised Statutes appears no longer in the United States Code. The following explanation appears:
"In a communication, dated November 29, 1940, from the Office of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior, it was stated that there have been no Indian agents since 1908, all of the agencies and schools having been placed under the supervision of superintendents."The following pertinent provisions still remain in the United States Code:
"The President may, from time to time, require additional security, and in larger amounts, from all persons charged or trusted, under the laws of the United States, with the disbursement or application of money, goods, or effects of any kind, on account of Indian affairs." (25 U.S.C. sec. 51.)The following kinds of bonds are now approved by the Chief Clerk:"When the Secretary of the Interior deems a new bond necessary he may, in his discretion, require any disbursing officer under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to execute a new bond, with approved sureties, in such amount as he may deem necessary, and when accepted and approved by the Secretary of the Interior the new bond shall be valid . . ." (25 U.S.C. sec. 52.)
"When it becomes necessary to make a large per capita payment to Indians, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, is authorized to require any disbursing officer of the Indian Department to file a special bond in such amount as may be necessary to make such payment in one installment." (25 U.S.C. sec. 52a.)
a. Bonds of Certifying Officers.These bonds are provided for specifically by the act of December 29, 1941 (55 Stat. 875, 31 U.S.C. sec. 82c Supp.), which reads in part as follows:
"The officer or employee certifying a voucher shall . . . (2) be required to give bond to the United States, with good and sufficient surety approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, in
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OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR |
JUNE 16, 1944 |
On February 16, 1942, the Treasury issued Department Circular No. 680 setting forth the standards and conditions prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, as directed by the act of December 29, 1941. In this circular, the Treasury prescribed the following standards and conditions, among others, concerning the bonds of certifying officers.such amount as may be determined by the head of the department, agency, or establishment concerned, pursuant to standards prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury . . ."
"Sec. 2. Bond of Certifying Officers: (a) Every officer or employee certifying a voucher to a disbursing officer under the executive branch of the Government . . . shall give bond, effective on April 1, 1942, or on such later date as his authorization becomes effective, with good and sufficient surety approved by the Secretary of the Treasury in such amount as may be determined by the head of the department, agency, or establishment concerned, pursuant to standards and under such conditions as are hereinafter prescribed . . .On February 26, 1942, Acting Secretary Dempsey issued Order No. 1654, containing certain procedures additional to those in Treasury Circular No. 680. The Acting Secretary fixed the usual amount of the bond of a certifying officer at $5,000, with a larger amount provided for in exceptional cases. The order then read:"Sec. 3. Standards for fixing amount of bond. The penal sum of each certifying officer's bond shall be fixed by the head of the department, establishment, or agency concerned in accordance with the degree of the officer's responsibility, taking into consideration the character and estimated amount of vouchers to be certified for payment during the ensuing twelve-months' period . . ."
"After examination in the bureau the original bond of a certifying officer will be prepared for approval by the Chief Clerk of the Department and enclosed with a letter of transmittal for his signature addressed to the Section of Surety Bonds, Bureau of Accounts, Treasury Department, Washington, D.C. A record of all bonds will be kept in the Office of the Chief Clerk, where the examination required every two years will be made."The advance to officers and employees of the Government of funds to be expended for subsistence while travelling on Government business is authorized by the act of June 3, 1926 (44 Stat. 689, 5 U.S.C. sec. 828, Supp.), in the following language:b. Bond for Subsistence Advance.
"The head of departments and establishments, under regulations which shall be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury for the protection of the United States, may advance through the proper disbursing officers from applicable appropriations to any person entitled to actual expenses or per diem allowance . . . such sums as may be deemed advisable considering the character and probable duration of the travel to be performed . . ."In a Memorandum for Heads of Bureaus and Offices, dated October 31, 1938, Acting Secretary Slattery wrote as follows:
"Enclosed is a copy of the Third Supplement to Treasury Department Circular No. 369, Revised, dated September 16, 1988, which relates to the filing of bonds of indemnity on Standard Form 19, to cover advances of public funds under the Subsistence Expense Act of 1926."Attention is invited to its provisions which require that the bonds covering advances made through the Division of Disbursement, Treasury Department,. shall be passed upon by the department or establishment authorizing the advances.
"Hereafter bonds, for travel advances obtained from the Division of Disbursement, will be initialled by a responsible bureau or office official and transmitted by the bureau to the Section of Surety Bonds, Office of the Commissioner of Accounts and Deposits, Treasury Department, for approval in accordance with Treasury Circular No. 369.
"The Chief Clerk and in his absence the Acting Chief Clerk of the Department are authorized to approve such bonds." (Emphasis supplied)
Memorandum
for Assistant Secretary Chapman:
On April 4, your office transmitted applications by ten Cheyenne River
Sioux allottees for cash
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allotment benefits and applications by three Indians of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe for their pro rata shares of tribal funds on deposit in the Treasury of the United States. These applications had been submitted to you by the Office of Indian Affairs for your approval. Mr. Doty, in a memorandum for Mr. Flanery of my office, inquired whether the duty of approving such applications can be delegated by the Secretary to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. I have concluded that such functions may properly be delegated.
Cash Allotment Benefits
The allotment of cash benefits to the Cheyenne River Sioux. is governed by an act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 888), as amended by the act of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. 321). By the act of March 2, 1889, a portion of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation, in the Territory of Dakota, was divided into separate reservations, including the Cheyenne River Reservation which, pursuant to section 4 of the act, was set aside as a permanent reservation "for the Indians receiving rations and annuities at the Cheyenne River Agency, in said Territory of Dakota . . ." Under section 8 of the act, the President was authorized to allot portions of these reservations in severalty to the Indians located upon them.1
Section 17 of the act in part provided that:
"The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to purchase, from time to time, for the use of said Indians, such and so many American breeding cows of good quality, not exceeding twenty-five thousand in number, and bulls of like quality, not exceeding one thousand in number, as in his judgment can be under regulations furnished by him, cared for and preserved, with their increase, by said Indians: Provided, That each head of family or single person over the age of eighteen years, who shall have or may hereafter take his or her allotment of land in severalty, shall be provided with two milch cows, one pair of oxens, with yoke and chain, or two mares and one set of harness in lieu of said oxen, yoke and chain, as the Secretary of the Interior may deem advisable, and they shall also receive one plow, one wagon, one harrow, one hoe, one axe, and one pitchfork, all suitable to the work they may have to do, and also fifty dollars in cash; to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior in aiding such Indians to erect a house and other buildings suitable for residence or the improvement of his allotment . . ."In the act of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. 321, 334), making appropriations for the Indian Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, it was provided:
"The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to ascertain the number of Sioux and Ponca Indians in South Dakota and Nebraska who would not be benefited by the fulfillment of the proviso of section seventeen of . . . . [the act of March 2, 1889] . . . by the receipt from the United States of the articles of personal property therein mentioned and who desire to have the same converted into money, and in lieu of such articles of personal property, or any part thereof he may think proper, the Secretary of the Interior shall convert or commute the same, or so much thereof as he may think proper, into money, and pay the amount thereof to such Indians; and the payment under the provisions of this Act shall be held to be a liquidation of the obligation of the United States to said Indians under that portion of said section seventeen, so far as the articles of personal property therein named are concerned." 2When the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), was adopted, it became necessary because of the prohibition contained in section 1 of the act against further allotments in severalty to preserve the rights granted by the acts of March 2, 1889, and June 10, 1896. This was done by section 14 of the Indian Reorganization Act (48 Stat. 987, 26 U.S.C. sec. 474), which continued the allowances in effect. The history of the Indian Reorganization Act does not indicate that any change in the administrative functions of the Secretary was intended.
While the power to make distributions of personal property, as well as the power to make substitute cash payments, is thus conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior, for the reasons set forth in the memorandum of Solicitor Gardner to you, dated August 26, 1943, I believe that the use of such language does not determine whether the power of the Secretary may be delegated to a responsible subordinate such as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (see particularly Solicitor Gard-
____________
1
Section 19 of the May 29, 1908 (35 Stat. 444, 451), authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to cause allotments to be made "under the provisions" of
the act of March 2, 1889, "to any living children of the Sioux tribe of
Indians belonging on any of the Great Sioux reservations affected thereby
and who have not heretofore been allotted, so long as the tribe to which
such Indian children belong is possessed of any unallotted tribal or reservation
lands . . ."
2
See 25 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 224, secs. 224.1-224.5.
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ner's Opinion, pp. l-7). In the absence of a clear indication of contrary congressional intent, the very nature of the duties required justifies the conclusion that personal action by the Secretary is not contemplated. Government could not go on if cabinet officers were personally required to distribute hoes and pitchforks to Indians in South Dakota. Reference to the congressional debates on the bill which eventuated in the act of March 2, 1889, fails to indicate a legislative intention to impose any such impossible burden upon the Secretary. If anything, the final clause of that portion of section 17 quoted above-"to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior in aiding such Indians to erect a house and other buildings suitable for residence or the improvement of his allotment"-which was added by the Senate as an amendment to the original House bill,3 reveals a recognition that the distributions were to be made "under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior" rather than personally by him.4
In authorizing the allotment of cash in lieu of personal property enumerated in the March 2 act, Congress did not indicate that any greater personal participation by the Secretary was contemplated or required.5
Pro Rata Shares
While the allotment of pro rata shares of tribal funds on deposit in the Treasury to the credit of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe is governed by different statutes, I believe that the secretarial power to pass on applications for such allotments may likewise be delegated.
The act of March 2, 1907 (34 Stat. 1221) provides:
"That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his discretion, from time to time, to designate any individual Indian belonging to any tribe or tribes whom he may deem to be capable of managing his or her affairs, and of any tribal or trust funds on deposit in the [sic] he may cause to be apportioned and allotted to any such Indian his or her pro rata share Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribe or tribes of which said Indian is a member, and the amount so apportioned and allotted shall be placed to the credit of such Indian upon the books of the Treasury, and the same shall thereupon be subject to the order of such Indian: Provided, That no apportionment or allotment shall be made to any Indian until such Indian has first made an application therefor: Provided further, That the Secretaries of the Interior and the Treasury are hereby directed to withhold from such apportionment and allotment a sufficient sum of the said Indian funds as may be necessary or required to pay any existing claims against said Indians that may be pending for settlement by judicial determination in the Court of Claims or in the Executive Department of the Government, at time of such apportionment and allotment.Under section 2 of this act the Secretary was also authorized to pay physically incapacitated Indians their portions of tribal trust funds on deposit in the Treasury. This latter section was amended by a provision in the act making appropriations for the Bureau, of Indian Affairs for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917 (39 Stat. 123, 128). The provision in question now reads:
" 'That the pro rata share of any Indian who is mentally or physically incapable of managing his or her own affairs may be withdrawn from the Treasury in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior and expended for the benefit of such Indian under such rules, regulations, and conditions as the said Secretary may prescribe:' [6] Provided, That said funds of any Indian shall not be withdrawn from the Treasury until needed by the Indian and upon his application and when approved by the Secretary of the Interior."The House bill from which the act of March 2, 1907, was derived, originally provided "That the President is hereby authorized, in his discretion, from time to time . . ." to designate individual Indians and cause allotments to be made to them. When the bill went to the Senate, it was changed in committee to provide "that the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, and directed . . ." to perform the stipulated duties.7 The words "and directed" were subsequently eliminated in the
___________
3
See 20 Cong. Rec. 2284 (Feb. 25, 1889).
4 In view of the context and grammatical logic, the semicolon separating the final clause inserted by the Senate should be disregarded. It is then not entirely clear whether the final clause qualifies the whole of the preceding clause or simply that portion relating to payment of the fifty dollars. As a practical matter, there would be more reason to require the Secretary personally to approve the payment of funds than personally to distribute livestock and farm equipment. Since the payment of the funds is to be made "under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior," it is only fair to assume that the distribution of the personal property is governed by no more stringent requirement.
5
The language of the appropriation act of June 10, 1896, quoted above, was
inserted as a Senate amendment. 28 Cong.
Rec.
3713 (April 8, 1896).
6 See 25 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 224, sec. 224.5; Part 233, sec. 233.3.
7
See Report No. 4634, Senate, 59th Cong., 2d sess.; Report No. 6637, Senate,
59th Cong., 2d sess. Cong. Rec. 3179 (Feb. 18, 1907).
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR |
JUNE 16, 1944 |
Senate, sitting as a Committee of the whole.8 It is doubtful whether these changes have any significance; there is nothing in the debates which indicates that personal action by either the President or the Secretary was contemplated at any time.
The amendatory language of the appropriation act was inserted by the Senate for the purpose, it was explained, "to enable those Indians who are able-bodied but noncompetent-and the use of the word 'noncompetent' in Indian laws and treaties refers to their inability to handle their own funds-to use those funds, or to enable the Secretary to use them for them, for their industrial betterment."9 In the discussion of the amendment it was contended that it was anomalous to require an Indian who was mentally incapable of managing his own affairs to make an application for a pro rata share before such moneys could be paid to him. The following colloquy took place:
"Mr. SUTHERLAND. Why provide for the utterly useless formality on the part of an insane Indian of making an application to withdraw money?I believe that this rather casual exchange establishes no more than a congressional awareness of what was believed to be the existing policy of the Department with respect to the processing of applications for pro rata shares. It certainly fails to demonstrate a congressional desire to confine in the Secretary, individually, the power to approve the applications. Nowhere in the history of the legislation have I discovered such a purpose declared or implied."Mr. LANE. It is a request. The Indian can apply for help, as any other hungry man would. He can go and say that he is hungry or that he is cold. That is all this is for.
"Mr. SUTHERLAND. Of course, if every body is satisfied with that sort of a provision, I suppose I should not object to it.
"Mr. LANE. If he has not sense enough to do that, he ought to starve.
"Mr. SUTHERLAND. I will ask the Senator from Oregon how the application is made. Does he fill out a written blank?
"Mr. LANE. No; he applies in person. Most of the Indians are unable to write the English language; at least, the old full bloods are.
"MR. SUTHERLAND. How is he to apply to the Secretary of the Interior in person-an insane Indian off on a reservation?
"Mr. LANE. He applies to the superintendent.
"Mr. SUTHERLAND. It is certainly an anomaly.
"Mr. LANE. And .then it has to be approved. I think all these applications have to be finally approved by the Secretary.
"MR. SUTHERLAND. It occurs to me that the proviso is not only somewhat nonsensical, but that it is absolutely unnecessary. The substantive provision is that the pro rata share of the Indian so incapacitated may be withdrawn from the Treasury, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, and expended for his benefit. Why is not that enough?"
Conclusions
Accordingly, I believe that the power to approve both applications for cash allotment benefits and for pro rata shares of tribal funds may be delegated by the Secretary to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. In the event that the Secretary's power to approve the applications is delegated to the Commissioner, I recommend, however, that provision be made for an opportunity to appeal to the Secretary from the Commissioner's determination. It would also be desirable to supplement existing regulations relating to cash allotment benefits, so that determinations could be made by the Commissioner on the basis of standards prescribed by the Secretary. In this way the supervision and direction of the Secretary, contemplated in some of the statutes may be maintained.
The applications submitted with your memorandum appear to be in order, and I suggest that you approve them, pending determination of the desirability of delegation.
FOWLER HARPER,
MY DEAR MR. FOLTA:
I think that you are putting an unwarranted construction upon my letter of May 16 in assuming that the Native Village of Minto "having
_____________
8 41 Cong. Rec. 3012-3013 (Feb. 15, 1907). See also 41 Cong.
Rec. 3179 (Feb. 18, 1907).
9 33 Cong. Rec. 4682 (March 23, 1916). Cf. also 53 Cong.
Rec. 2140-2141 (Feb. 4, 1916).
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OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR |
JUNE 29, 1944 |
adopted a constitution
requiring conformity to the Federal Constitution and laws, has no power
to enact an ordinance on searches and seizures at variance with the provisions
of the 4th amendment and of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, 40
Stat. 228."
I am unable to find any provision in the constitution in the constitution of the Native Village of Minto explicitly requiring conformity to the Federal Constitution. The first subparagraph of Article IV, section 1, of the constitution, provides merely that the Village shall have power
"To do all things for the common good which it has done or has had the right to do in the past and which are not against Federal law and such Territorial law as may apply."Of course, Federal law might be construed to include the Federal Constitution but, as I have pointed out in the previous correspondence on this subject, the Federal Constitution does not subject Indian tribes to those constitutional restraints imposed only on the Federal Government or the States. When, therefore, an Indian constitution states that its governing body shall exercise certain powers "subject to any limitations imposed by the statutes or the Constitution of the United States," it is simply declarative of the existing constitutional doctrine that an Indian tribe is bound only by those constitutional limitations that are absolute, and hence applicable to all forms of governmental action.
You refer also to the act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 228, 18 U.S.C. secs. 611-33). This act applies only to warrants "issued by a judge of a United States District court, or by a judge of a State or Territorial court of record, or by a United States Commissioner for the district wherein the property sought is located." It would not, therefore, apply to warrants issued by a native court or council, or to searches and seizures authorized by either of such bodies.
FOWLER HARPER,
Syllabus
Re:
Partitioning of Indian land held under a deed approved by the Secretary of the Interior subject to restriction against alienation without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior.Held:
1. The Secretary of the Interior may not partition land held under a restricted deed by virtue of the authority vested in him by the act of May 18, 1916 (39 Stat. 129, 25 U.S.C. sec. 378), which act authorizes him to partition inherited trust allotments.Memorandum, for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs:2. No partitioning of the Indian's restricted interest in land effected by a decree of a State court would be binding on the United States unless it were a party to the suit.
3. A non-Indian owner of an undivided interest in restricted Indian land cannot make the United States a party to any suit brought for the purpose of partitioning lands held under a restricted deed.
4. Such a non-Indian owner's only remedy appears to be the enactment of legislation conferring upon some court jurisdiction to partition the land.
I am returning for your further consideration the attached letter to Herbert K. Hyde, Esq., relating to the partition of the NE1/4 of section 33, township 9 North, Range 1 East, in Cleveland County, Oklahoma. The W1/2 of this quarter section was originally the allotment of William Phelps and the E1/2 thereof was the original allotment of John Phelps, both of whom were members of the Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indians.
Margaret Holmes, an heir to an undivided one-half interest in both tracts
of land, conveyed her interest in both the E1/2 W1/2 of the NE1/4 to John
H. Goodin, a white man, and John H. Goodin, legal guardian for John William
Goodin, an Indian, heirs to the remaining undivided interest, by deed dated
March 2, 1901. The deed was approved by the Department on May 20, 1901,
subject to the restriction that any conveyance of the land must be approved
by the Secretary of the Interior to pass valid title. The consideration
for this conveyance was the conveyance by the Goodins of their undivided
interests in other lands. The Secretary of the Interior was, of course,
without authority to place any restrictions against the alienation of the
one-fourth undivided interest which John H. Goodin acquired under the aforementioned
deed and since John H. Goodin likewise acquired his original one-fourth
undivided interest unrestricted it followed that his undivided
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR |
JUNE 29, 1944 |
one-half interest in the land was unrestricted from and after 1901.1
John H. Goodin's unrestricted undivided interest is now claimed by B. H. Goodin, also a white man, subject to his mineral deed to one R. A. Heffner, covering a one-eighth interest in the W1/2 of the NE1/4 and a mortgage to one J. B. Webb, covering his undivided one-half interest in the W1/2 thereof. The remaining undivided one-half interest is still in Indian ownership and is still restricted against alienation without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. It is now owned by Edith Fay Goodin Woodring, Thomas Goodin and J. R. Goodin.
On October 3, 1939, your Office submitted for approval two deeds, one from B. H. Goodin and his wife, Stella, conveying to the Indian owners their undivided interests in and to the E1/2 of the NE1/4 and the other from the Indian owners conveying to B. H. Goodin their undivided interests in the W1/2 thereof. These deeds, if approved, would have accomplished the partition of the lands. The exchange deeds were not approved at that time because of certain deficiencies shown by the abstract of title submitted with the deeds.2
The deeds were resubmitted for approval on September 25, 1940, but by a memorandum of October 24, 1940, this office held that since the continuation of the abstract of title disclosed that the Secretary of the Interior had approved an oil and gas lease on the restricted interests in these lands and that the unrestricted interest had also been leased for oil and gas purposes and further that a mineral deed to an undivided one-eighth interest in the oil and gas and other minerals on the W1/2 of the NE1/4 had been executed by B. H. Goodin and his wife, it would be necessary that the parties execute new deeds.
Trouble seems to have arisen between B. H. Goodin and the Indian heirs at about that time. The Indians have ever since consistently refused to execute new deeds or to do anything toward settling their controversy with B. H. Goodin or getting the lands partitioned.
On June 8, 1943, B. H. Goodin, through his attorney, Herbert K. Hyde, Esq., served notice on the United States District Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma and on the Superintendent of the Shawnee Indian Agency that he had on May 13, 1943, commenced an action in the District Court of Cleveland County, Oklahoma, against the Indian owners for the partition of the lands. After the Superintendent called the suit to the attention of this Department, he was informed by your letter of August 4, 1943, that while the position of the Office of Indian Affairs ordinarily was that a State court was without jurisdiction over restricted Indian land, in view of the existing circumstances your Office was willing to waive the matter of jurisdiction and let the court proceed with the proposed partition proceedings with the understanding that the decree in partition would be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. It was suggested that the Superintendent so advise the United States Attorney. That letter was approved by the Department on September 10, 1943. Evidently the letter was approved by the Department of Justice dated June 19, 1943, and transmitted to your Office on June 23, 1943, was overlooked. It is not with the present record. In that letter the Department of Justice pointed out that the State court did not have jurisdiction to partition the land and stated that the United States Attorney had been instructed to move and quash the service on him and the Superintendent and to move to dismiss on behalf of the restricted Indians, if the attorney for Goodin refused to dismiss the action voluntarily. Thereafter Goodin dismissed his suit in the State court.
On August 23, 1943, at the suggestion of the United States Attorney, Goodin petitioned the Secretary to partition the land "under and by virtue of the authority granted to the Secretary of the Interior under the act of May 18, 1916" (39 Stat. 127, 25 U.S.C. sec. 378).
In his petition, B. H. Goodin states that although he is the owner of an undivided one-half interest in she lands he is being entirely excluded therefrom and that he is receiving no income therefrom. He states further that he has no remedy in any court of competent jurisdiction and that he can secure no relief except through the proper action of the Secretary of the Interior.
On December 21, 1943, your Office advised the Superintendent:
". . . After carefully considering the matter and in view of the fact that the lands involved are not in a trust status but are held under restricted deeds, it has been determined that the lands cannot be partitioned by the issuance of a fee patent to the white man and a trust patent to the Indian heirs. The partition, if made by the Department will therefore have to be through the means of appropriate deeds executed by the parties involved. The only other alternative is to have the lands partitioned by appropriate court action as heretofore attempted by Mr. B. H. Goodin, the white man."_____________
2 See Solicitor's opinion M-30440, August 4, 1940.
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OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR |
JULY 5, 1944 |
The Superintendent was instructed to call upon the Indians to execute a proper deed or to show cause why proper court action should not be instituted to partition the lands. On February 10, 1944, the Superintendent informed you that none of the Indians was willing to execute a new deed.
You now propose to inform Mr. Hyde that there will be no objection on the part of the Department to the bringing of an appropriate action in the State court to have the land partitioned. I do not agree that the Department should so inform Mr. Hyde. The Department's action of September 10, 1943, acquiescing in the partitioning of these lands by the State court was ill-advised. It was, however, based on the fact that the United States Attorney had been served with notice in this suit and the belief that he would take whatever action might be necessary to protect the interests of the United States and the Indians. The fact that the Attorney General had already instructed the United States Attorney to move to dismiss the suit was not brought to the attention of the Department at that time. The same mistake should not be repeated.
Obviously, as your Office recognizes, the State court has no jurisdiction over the restricted interest in this land.3 Any partitioning of the land effected by a decree of such a court would not be binding upon the United States and could be set aside by the United States unless it were a party to the suit.4 I know of no way in which Mr. Goodin could make the United States a party to any suit which he might bring to partition the lands.
I agree with you that the lands may not be partitioned under the act of May 18, 1916, supra. That act authorizes the Secretary to partition inherited trust allotments and to issue patents in fee to competent heirs and trust patents to incompetent heirs. The Secretary may not issue a patent in fee or a trust patent for lands held under a restricted deed.
It seems inescapable, therefore, that Mr. Goodin has no remedy in the Department or in the courts for the situation in which he finds himself. The only possible source of relief open co Mr. Goodin appears to be the enactment of legislation conferring upon some court jurisdiction to partition the lands. In this connection your attention is called to the act of June 29, 1936 (49 Stat. 2368), validating certain conveyances of Kickapoo Indians in Oklahoma. Section 2 of that act conferred upon the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma jurisdiction to hear and determine partition actions involving the lands specified in that act. If, as an administrative matter, you believe that the present involved ownership of the lands warrants such a measure, it might be well for you to give consideration to the propriety of informing Mr. Hyde that the Department would have no objection .to the enactment of a private law for the relief of his client.
FOWLER HARPER,
Memorandum
to Indian Office:
Authority for the cancellation or adjustment of reimbursable charges due the Government by individual Indians contained in the sot of July 1, 1932 (47 Stat. 564), does not include authority to cancel interest to be earned on the unpaid or uncanceled principal of the loan. To cancel interest due under the terms of the reimbursable contract under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1932, the interest must exist as a debt on the date of the cancellation action, interest due in the future cannot be cancelled as such action would modify the terms of a contract prejudicial to the interests of the Government.
HARPER, Solicitor:
Memorandum for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs:
This will refer to your Office memorandum dated January 18 and the file attached thereto regarding loan agreement CF-69 between the United States and Paul and Mabel Starr of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, Oklahoma.
An examination of the record before this Department discloses that loan agreement CF-69, Contract #I-13, Ind. 11656, was approved on November 10, 1938, covering a loan of $1,394 to Paul and Mabel Starr. This agreement was entered into for the purpose of refinancing a prior loan under agreement CF-16, Contract #I-13, Ind. 10003, then delinquent in the amount of $1,047, and to provide additional funds for other matters, fully set forth therein.
Section 15 of the agreement provides for the payment to the United States of interest at the rate of three percent per annum. The loan which was approved on November 10, 1938, became delinquent and was foreclosed. Certain sums were
____________
3 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, ch. 19, sec. 5.
4 United States v. Hellard, decided by
the United States Supreme Court on May 15, 1944.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR |
JULY 5, 1944 |
realized as a result of the foreclosure that were credited against the amount due. There is now due on the principal of the loan a balance of $861.60 and interest of $52.27 computed to November 1, 1943. Your Office asked whether under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1932 (47 Stat. 564), interest on this obligation can be cancelled.
The real question presented, however, is whether a contract to which the United States is a part can be modified by administrative action prejudicial to the interest of the Government. In the absence of a statute specifically so providing, no officer of the Government has authority to give away or surrender a right vested in or acquired by the Government under a contract. Simpson v. United States, 172 U.S. 372; United States v. American Sales Corporation, 27 F. (2d) 389, aff'd 32 F. (2d) 141, cert. denied 280 U.S. 574.
The Court of Claims stated in the case entitled Pacific Hardware Company v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 327-335, in part as follows:
"It is unquestionably true that an official of the Government is not authorized to give away or remit a claim due the Government. This rule is grounded in a sound public policy and is not to be weakened . . ."The rule is equally applicable to the accounting as well as the administrative officials of the Government and considerations of sympathy for the possible misfortune of the borrower do not authorize the waiving of the rule. 20 Comp. Gen. 703.
It is therefore clear that the loan agreement contract cannot be modified prejudicial to the interest of the Government by the elimination of interest in the absence of statutory authority granting the Secretary such power.
We must now look to the act of July 1, 1932, supra, for such authority, if any exists. The pertinent parts of the act follow:
"That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to adjust or eliminate reimbursable charges of the Government of the United States existing as debts against individual Indians or tribes of Indians in such a way as shall be equitable and just in consideration of all the circumstances under which such charges were made: . . . That any proceedings hereunder shall not be effective until approved by Congress unless Congress shall have failed to act favorable or unfavorably thereon by concurrent resolution within sixty legislative days after the filing of said report, in which case they shall become effective at the termination of the said sixty legislative days." (Italics supplied.)Under the provisions of the act above quoted the Secretary is authorized to adjust or eliminate reimbursable charges existing as a debt. Unless modified by contractual terms not present in this case interest does not exist as a debt until it has been earned and is unpaid. The language of the statute would not, in the opinion of this office, authorize the Secretary to modify the provisions of a contract prejudicial to the interests of the Government by cancelling interest yet unearned so long as the principal part of the loan is outstanding. The Secretary under the provisions of this act could cancel the total principal and accrued interest to date of cancellation but he could not cancel unearned interest such as you propose in your memorandum.
This office is of the opinion that in this particular case the loan should be permitted to remain in status quo until such time as its collection can be made or you can recommend its cancellation under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1932, supra. The files submitted with your memorandum are returned herewith.
FOWLER HARPER,
Memorandum:
The land purchased by the United States in trust for the Spokane Tribe with funds appropriated by the acts of June 18, 1940 (54 Stat. 416) and June 28, 1941 (55 Stat. 314), became part of the Spokane Reservation. The Spokane Indians having voted not to accept the provisions of the act of June 13, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), the allotment laws continue applicable to the Spokane Reservation. The act of February 14, 1923 (42 Stat. 1246), extended the allotment laws to lands purchased for the use and benefit of the tribe, and such land is available for allotment exchanges under the act of April 23, 1904 (33 Stat. 297), to the same extent as other reservation land.
Memorandum for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs:
This will refer to your proposed letter to the Superintendent of the Colville
Indian Agency, dated May 16, 1944, in which it is stated that there is
no legal authority under which the Secretary of
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OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR |
JULY 7, 1944 |
the Interior may accept a relinquishment of the trust patent covering the allotment of Milo Abrahamson, Spokane allottee. No. 601, and issue to him a lieu trust patent covering an equal acreage of tribal land which was recently purchased with tribal funds.
The tribal land involved in the proposed exchange is described as the W1/2 SE1/4 of Sec. 35, T. 29 N. R. 39 E.W.M., Washington. This land was originally allotted to Charley Haines, Spokane allottee No, 268, to whom a fee patent was issued therefore on December 6, 1917. In 1942 it was purchased by the United States in trust for the Spokane Tribe with tribal funds appropriated by the acts of June 18, 1940 (54 Stat. 416), and June 20, 1941 (55 stat. 314).
It is true that the issuance of a fee patent for the above-described land
operated to divest the United States of the jurisdiction it had over the
tract at that time, but upon the return of the land to tribal ownership
it became a part of the Spokane Reservation. The courts and this Department
have held that any land in which an Indian tribe has occupancy rights may
be considered reservation land, without regard to the method in which those
rights were acquired, and no formal order designating the land an Indian
reservation is required to give it that status. (See United States
v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938); Memo. Sol. I.D., July 1,
1938; Op. Sol. I.D., February 12, 1943, M. 31480; and Memo. Assistant Secretary,
May 22,
1944.)
The Indians of the Spokane Tribe voted not to accept the provisions of the act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984). The allotment laws are therefore applicable to the lands of the Spokane Reservation. Purchased lands were brought within the scope of these laws by the act of February 14, 1923 (42 Stat. 1246), which reads as follows:
"That unless otherwise specifically provided, the provisions of the act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat. 388), as amended, be, and they are hereby, extended to all lands heretofore purchased or which may hereafter be purchased by authority of Congress for the use or benefit of any individual Indian or band or tribe of Indians."It is apparent from the foregoing that the tribal land here under consideration is available to the same extent as other reservation land for the purpose of allotment exchanges. Specific authority for such exchanges is contained in the act of April 23, 1904 (33 Stat. 297). See Op. Sol. January 29, 1914 (43 L.D. 84).
There being no legal obstacle to the proposed exchange, I am returning the papers for your further consideration of the administrative question presented.
FOWLER HARPER,
Memorandum, July 7, 1944.
The Pueblos of New Mexico possess the requisite capacity to enter into binding contracts, the validity of which depend upon the legality of the object and the means of attaining that object. Under sections 5 and 7 of the act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), the Secretary of the Interior may acquire lands for the Acoma and Laguna Pueblos and declare them to be Indian reservation lands, and such action is not in violation of the act of May 25, 1918 (40 Stat. 561, 570). The so-called compensation funds of the Picuris and Pojoaque Pueblos are available for any purpose considered of real benefit to the pueblo concerned, other than per capita payments, which is approved by the governing officials of the pueblos and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. A loan of such funds to the Acoma and Laguna Pueblos to augment their present land holdings must be protected by adequate security and must return the lending pueblos the same or a greater rate of interest than the funds are now earning on deposit in the United States Treasury. The lands of the Acoma and Laguna Pueblos, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, are subject to the inhibitions on alienation or encumbrance found in section 4 of the 1934 act, supra.
HARPER, Solicitor:
AVAILABILITY
OF PUEBLO COMPENSATION FUNDS
FOR THE PURPOSE
OF LOANS TO OTHER PUEBLOS
Memorandum
for Assistant Secretary Chapman:
In a memorandum of May 8 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs presented the
question of whether
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR |
JULY 7, 1944 |
the so-called compensation funds of .the Picuris and Pojoaque Pueblos may be loaned to the Acoma and Laguna Pueblos for the purpose of enabling the borrowers to purchase certain patented lands and improvements within the Eleven Townships purchase area.
The Commissioner's memorandum recites none of the details of the proposal. There are several questions which naturally suggest themselves and which I believe would have to be answered before a definite opinion could be given as to the legality of the proposal. For example, there is no information as to these and other features of the proposal for the repayment of the loans. The plans for repayment, including the promises to be made for the payment of interest and the pledging of property as security, would constitute integral parts of the loan transaction. In the absence of information as to these and other features of the proposal it is believed that it would be inadvisable to venture an opinion at this time on whether the loans can or cannot be made.
Whatever the details of the proposal may be, however, there are certain fundamental legal principles which would apply in any event. I will discuss these principles briefly below in the belief that such discussion may prove helpful in reaching the administrative conclusions which will be required.
The proposed loan transaction is, of course, a contractual one, and it is apparent that the action proposed by each party to the contract must rest upon legal authority. It is well settled that the Pueblos of New Mexico have the status of separate legal entities, possessing the requisite capacity to enter into binding contracts.1 In the final analysis the contracts of the pueblos, as those of non-Indians, depend for their validity upon the legality of the object to be attained and the legality of the means of attainment employed by the contracting parties.
It is the object of the present proposal to augment the land holdings of the Acoma and Laguna Pueblos. The property and affairs of both of these pueblos are subject to the provisions of the act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), section 5 of which specifically authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands for the tribe. Under section 7 of that act the lands so acquired may be proclaimed to be Indian reservations. Action so taken by the Secretary under these specific authorizations is not in violation of the act of May 25, 1918 (46 Stat. 561, 570), which prohibits additions to Indian reservations in the State of New Mexico "except by Act of Congress." Thus it is clear that the purpose of the proposed loans is a legal purpose, and that the borrowing pueblos may augment their present holdings through the purchase of lands. There remain for consideration the question of whether the compensation funds of the Picuris and Pojoaque Pueblos are available for the purpose of loans, and if they are so available, the further question of whether the Acoma and Laguna Pueblos are in a position to meet the conditions under which the funds are available.
In my memorandum of March 1, 1944, I held that the compensation funds of the Picuris and Pojoaque Pueblos were available for the purchase of lands to be thereafter leased to the Ramah Navajos provided it was administratively determined that the purchases were in fact being made for the benefit of the pueblos. That memorandum listed the several appropriation acts by which appropriations were made to the Picuris and Pojoaque Pueblos to compensate them for lands and water rights lost to them pursuant to the Pueblo Lands Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 636). It was shown that with the exception of one item of $7,684.50 made available by the act of March 4, 1929 (45 Stat. 1562, 1569), for the purchase of a particular tract of land for the Picuris Pueblo the balance of the funds of both pueblos was continued available until expended by the acts of May 9, 1938 (52 Stat. 291, 299), and May 10, 1939 (53 Stat. 685, 694). These latter acts incorporated language which had first appeared in the act of August 9, 1937 (50 Stat. 571, 572), making the funds available not only for the original purposes, i.e., the reacquisition or replacement of properties lost pursuant to the 1924 act, but also "for such other purposes, except per capita payments, as may be recommended by the governing officials of the particular pueblos involved, and be approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs."
It is to be borne in mind that the compensation funds of the pueblos are not gratuities from the United States. As their name implies they are of a compensatory character, a quid pro quo, belonging to the pueblos and merely held in trust by the Government. Thus, while it appears from the comprehensive language of the appropriation acts, quoted above, that these funds are available for any purpose other than per capita payments, it would be a mistake to assume that there are no limitations on the use of the funds. The high degree of care imposed by the law on any fiduciary limits the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the approval of those expenditures recommended by the governing officials which result in a real bene-
____________
1 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Ch.
14, sec. 5, and Ch. 20.
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JULY 18, 1944 |
fit to the pueblo.2 Whether a loan of these funds to other pueblos meets this standard depends upon whether a tangible advantage accrues to the lending pueblos. The moneys are now in the Treasury of the United States, drawing interest at the rate of four per cent per annum. This is the safest investment known to our Government, and I have no hesitancy, therefore, in expressing the opinion that any loan of these funds to other pueblos must be protected by adequate security and must return at least the same if not a greater rate of interest than the funds now earn. In view of the inhibitions contained in the act of June 18, 1934, supra, no lands of the Acoma or Laguna Pueblos, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, would be available for pledge as security for the loans. The ability of these pueblos to make and carry out a promise for the repayment of the substantial amount that would be involved, with interest, depends upon matters not in the record before me.
If it is found to be administratively feasible to proceed with the formulation of plans for the proposal within the limits of the fundamental principles mentioned above a complete outline of the proposal should be prepared and submitted by the Commissioner for review of the legal questions involved.
FOWLER HARPER,
Approved
and referred to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs: July 8, 1944.
OSCAR L. CHAPMAN, Assistant Secretary.
OSAGE OF LESS
THAN ONE-HALF BLOOD--WHITE
WIFE AND KAW
MOTHER--RIGHTS OF
INHERITANCE
The attached file relates to the estate of Andrew Baconrind, deceased unallotted Osage Indian, who died intestate on February 1, 1943.
Andrew was the son of George Baconrind, Osage Allotted No. 746, who had 13/16 degrees of Osage blood. Andrew's mother is a Kaw Indian of one half or more Indian blood. Andrew was therefore of more than one-half Indian blood but of less than one-half Osage blood. He left an estate consisting of 1 and 11/192ds Osage headlights, surplus funds, trust funds in the Treasury of the United States, inherited; lands and certain unrestricted money on deposit at the Osage Agency. He was survived by his wife, Marie, a white woman, and by his mother, Bertha Baconrind Endicott, each of whom would take one-half of his estate under the laws of Oklahoma, unless the white widow is prohibited from taking any part of the restricted Osage estate by reason of section 7 of the act of February 27, 1925 (43 Stat. 1008), which provides:
"Hereafter none but heirs of Indian blood shall inherit from those who are of one-half or more Indian blood of the Osage Tribe of Indians any right, title, or interest to any restricted lands, moneys, or mineral interests of the Osage Tribe. . . ."The attorney for the administrator of Andrew Baconrind's estate requested to be informed whether, in the opinion of this Department, the widow could share in the estate. The question of whether section 7 bars white persons from inheriting from Osage Indians of more than one-half Indian blood or only from Osage Indians of more than one-half Osage blood has never been determined by the courts. On September 20, 1943, I informed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that while section 7 was ambiguous and susceptible of two possible meanings in my opinion Marie Baconrind was barred from inheriting any part of Andrew Baconrind's restricted estate.
Meanwhile, the administrator of Andrew Baconrind's estate made demand upon the Superintendent of the Osage Agency for the payment to him of the surplus funds to Baconrind's credit at the Osage Agency and also of the trust funds to Baconrind's credit in the United States Treasury. This demand was based upon that part of section 4 of the act of March 2, 1929 (45 Stat. 1478), which provides:
". . . Upon the death of any Osage Indian of less than one-half of Osage Indian blood or upon the death of an Osage Indian who has a certificate of competency, his moneys and funds and other property accrued and accruing to his credit shall be paid and delivered to the administrator or executor of his estate to be administered upon acceding to the laws of the State of Oklahoma: Provided, That upon the____________
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR |
JULY 18, 1944 |
Section 4 of the act of March 2, 1929, supra, also provides:settlement of such estate any funds or property subject to the control or supervision of the Secretary of the Interior on the date of the approval of this Act, which have been inherited by or devised to any adult or minor heir or devisee of one-half or more Osage Indian blood who does not have a certificate of competency, and which have been paid or delivered by the Secretary of the Interior to the administrator or executor shall be paid or delivered by such administrator or executor to the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of such Indian and shall be subject to the supervision of the Secretary as provided by law."
"Upon the death of an Osage Indian of one half or more Indian blood who does not have a certificate of competency, his or her moneys and funds and other property accrued and accruing to his or her credit and which have heretofore been subject to supervision as provided by law may be paid to the administrator or executor of the estate of such deceased Indian or direct to his .heirs or devisees, or may be retained by the Secretary of the Interior in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, under regulations to be promulgated by him: Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior shall pay to administrators and executors of the estates of such deceased Osage Indians a sufficient amount of money out of such estates to pay all lawful indebtedness and costs and expenses of administration when approved by him; and, out of the shares belonging to heirs or devisees, above referred to, he shall pay the costs and expenses of such heirs or devisees, including attorney fees, when approved by him, in the determination of heirs or contest of wills."In my memorandum of October 28,1943, I stated that under a literal construction, both of the foregoing provisions were applicable to the Baconrind estate and that under such a construction the Department would be in a quandary as to whether its action with respect to turning over this estate to the administrator was discretionary or mandatory. I stated that I was unwilling without a thorough consideration of the matter to pass finally upon the proper construction to be given to the two above-mentioned provisions of section 4 of the 1929 act. I stated, however, that I saw no need for withholding action on the demand of the administrator pending a decision on the proper construction to be placed on section 4 of the 1929 act since neither of Andrew Baconrind's probable heirs was a member of the Osage tribe and since the funds would not be restricted in their hands. I suggested that the Secretary might well exercise his discretion under the provision of section 4 last quoted above and pay the funds over to the administrator. I suggested that the Commissioner recommend that the Secretary so exercise his discretion in this case. I called the Commissioner's attention to the fact, however, that the authority contained in section 4 of the 1929 act for the payment to administrators of the moneys and funds accrued and accruing to the credit of deceased Osage Indians did not extend to the segregated trust funds in the United States Treasury, such authority being confined to those funds which had accrued or which might accrue from the interest on said segregated trust funds and from the mineral royalties and bonuses.
Thereafter, on April 5, 1944, in a memorandum to the Commissioner, I expressed the opinion that in order to resolve the ambiguity in section 4 of the act of March 2, 1929, supra, the section must be construed, if possible, in such a manner that estates such, as Andrew Baconrind's would fall clearly and logically within either one or the other of the two provisions. The legislative history of the act as well as the consistent practice of the Department in dealing with Osage Indians of more than one-half Indian blood but of less than one half Osage blood led me to conclude that the estates of such Indians fall within the provision of section 4 last quoted above and that, therefore, it was within the discretion of the Secretary as to whether he would turn over their funds to administrators.
On April 24, 1944, the County Court of Kay County, Oklahoma, found that all of the property of which Andrew Baconrind died seized came, to him from his father, George Baconrind, that Andrew Baconrind was not a member of the Osage Tribe and was an unrestricted Indian heir of an Osage Indian of more than one-half Osage Indian blood. The court found further that the supervision and control by the Secretary of the Interior over the property inherited by Andrew Baconrind from his father was not authorized by the Federal laws governing the restrictions on Osage Indians and that the estate of Andrew Baconrind was not subject to the control or supervision of the Secretary of the Interior in any manner and that the heirs of Andrew Baconrind, whom the court determined to be .the widow and the mother, were entitled to have their entire inheritance delivered to them individually, absolutely and unrestricted.
The court found further that section 7 of the
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OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR |
JULY 22, 1944 |
act of February 27, 1925, supra, was plain and unambiguous and that the section applied only "to any restricted lands, moneys or mineral interests of the Osage Tribe." The court concluded that no bar existed to the inheritance by a person not of Indian blood from the estate of a deceased Osage Indian of less than one-half Indian blood of the Osage Tribe and that no bar existed to the inheritance of the property involved in this case since the court found the property to be unrestricted. The court directed the Osage Agency or any other agency having the property of said estate in its custody to turn over the same to the administrator. I understand that an appeal has been taken to the District Court of Kay County.
On May 25, 1944, the County Court ordered a partial distribution of the estate in the sum of $500 to Bertha Baconrind Endicott, the mother of Andrew Baconrind. The court found that there remained in the possession of the United States Treasury and under the control of the Osage Agency trust funds in the sum of $2,755.82 and surplus funds in the amount of $8,533.02. The court found that regardless of the outcome of the appeal to the District Court Bertha was entitled to share in the estate to the extent of one-half thereof. The court directed the Osage Agency to pay the sum of $500 to the administrator to be by him paid to Bertha Baconrind Endicott.
The attached memorandum from the Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs states that in view of the decision of the court he hesitates to recommend that any funds, other than the $500 for the partial distribution to Bertha Baconrind Endicott, be turned over to the administrator. He states, however, that if this office knows of no reason why all of the money should not be turned over to the administrator he would have no objection to paying the money to the administrator.
As I have indicated above, I believe that this estate falls within the provision of section 4 of the 1929 act last quoted a